









Using a sample of 347 demutualizing thrifts from 1991 to 2004, we show that the level of inside 
participation is not a traditional signal of firm performance. We conclude that unanticipated 
inside participation reflects the incentives of insiders to reduce the size of the offer to influence 
the level of expected IPO returns. We find unanticipated inside participation is related to lower 
offer size and higher initial returns, but we do not find a relationship between inside participation 
and post-IPO performance.   
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The Role of Insider Influence in Mutual-to-Stock Conversions 
 
 
Insiders are widely acknowledged to possess asymmetric information. Previous research 
suggests that insiders use asymmetric information related to firm value to enhance their personal 
trading strategies [Seyhun (1986); Lee (1997); Kahle (2000); Chalmers, Dann, and Harford 
(2002)]. We analyze thrift conversions to investigate the incentives of insiders who purchase 
shares when their firms convert from a mutual form of ownership to a stock form of ownership.   
Maksimovic and Unal (1993) analyze the influence of inside participation on depositor 
purchases, management’s choice of issue size, and initial returns during mutual-to-stock 
conversions. They conclude that the interests of insiders and outside investors are aligned in that 
both groups receive benefits from the initial returns at the time of the offer. They do not find 
evidence consistent with managers maximizing the issue size at the expense of outside investors 
in order to increase the resources under managerial control.   
We extend the work of Maksimovic and Unal (1993) by updating the sample period, 
refining the measure of inside participation, and further exploring the impact of inside 
participation on the choice of offer size and firm performance following the offer. We argue that 
when management purchases a larger than anticipated portion of the initial offer, they are 
communicating their confidence in the expected performance of the offer. We define the 
proportion of inside participation that is explained by firm characteristics as the anticipated or 
predicted participation using techniques similar to those in Aggarwal, Prabhala, and Puri (2002) 
and Barro (1977). Specifically, we posit that unanticipated participation signals management’s 
projection of future performance or their incentive to influence the offer terms in order to 
enhance their gains at the time of the offer.  
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Using a sample of 347 converting thrifts from 1991 to 2004, we find evidence consistent 
with participating managers enhancing returns at the initial public offer by influencing the size of 
the offer. We test whether a statistical relationship exists between unanticipated participation and 
initial returns, offer size, and post-conversion operating performance. The greater the level of 
unanticipated participation, the higher the initial returns and the lower the offer size; however, no 
relationship exists between higher levels of participation and long-term operating performance 
subsequent to conversion. As we demonstrate through a model developed by Masulis (1987), 
lower offer amounts are expected to result in greater gains at the IPO. We conclude that the level 
of inside participation is not a traditional signal of firm value; instead, greater than anticipated 
inside participation reflects incentives of insiders to reduce the size of the offer, resulting in the 
ability of insiders to capture a greater share of value from the demutualization.  
By comparing our sample characteristics to that of Masulis (1987), Maksimovic and Unal 
(1993), and Colantuoni (1998), we also document changes in the characteristics of demutualizing 
thrifts. Relative to demutualizations in the 1980’s and early 1990’s, thrifts in the 1990’s are well-
capitalized, sell at higher price-to-book ratios, and have larger first-day returns. 
In Section I of this paper we review the demutualization literature and the historical 
development of thrift demutualizations. Section II outlines our model development and empirical 
implications. We describe our data in Section III, our empirical results in Section IV, and Section 
V concludes. 
 
I. Demutualization Literature and History 
Most mutual thrift institutions originated as local cooperative ventures where members 
pool their savings to finance home mortgages. Although depositors nominally own their mutual 
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thrift, actual ownership rights are limited. For example, depositor claims to earnings are non-
transferable and the mutual thrift generally retains its earnings indefinitely. In a standard 
demutualization, a mutual thrift converts to a stock company as qualified depositors and insiders 
receive non-transferable rights to buy shares during the stock offer. Following conversion, the 
new shareholders own the contributed capital plus the equity that accumulated prior to the 
demutualization. 
Kroszner and Strahan (1996) argue that regulators encouraged capital-impaired thrifts to 
convert to stock organizations in the 1980s to bring private capital into the cash-starved industry. 
Masulis (1987) finds that mutual thrifts are more likely to convert if they are highly levered and 
operate in markets that exhibit greater competition and growth. Masulis (1987) reports an 
average initial one-day return of 5.6% for conversions from 1983-1987.  Maksimovic and Unal 
(1993) find average initial returns of 5.0% from 1980 to 1988, and Alli, Yau and Yung (1994) 
find an average of 7% from 1983 to 1987.   
The motivation and subsequent returns of conversions in the 1990s differ from earlier 
conversions. Mutual thrifts in this second wave of conversions are well-capitalized with 
dramatically higher initial returns. Barth, Brumbaugh and Kleidon (1994) report average initial 
returns of 24% for 1992 and 29% for 1993. Cox and Roden (1999) find average one-day adjusted 
returns of 26.3% for the period 1993 to 1997.   
Mutual thrift managers and directors claim that converting to a publicly traded company 
strengthens the institution by increasing current capital and improving access to capital markets. 
Stockholders with vested interest in superior performance improve company performance 
through increased scrutiny. In addition, the existence of common stock allows the firm to offer 
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stock incentives to managers and facilitates consolidations and acquisitions [Watterson and 
Laufenberg (1990)]. 
Some industry observers claim mutual thrift IPOs unjustly enrich thrift insiders because 
the transactions lack the usual tension between buyers and sellers. Because mutual thrifts have 
no clear residual claimants, no shareholders have incentive to argue for a higher price during the 
conversion to a stock company. It is well recognized that insiders in the thrift industry have 
incentives and opportunities to profit from mutual-to-stock conversions [Meredith (1994)]. 
Mutual insiders, who typically initiate and help set the terms of the IPO, are also eligible to 
participate in the offer. Insiders work with underwriters and appraisers to set the conversion 
terms allowing depositors and insiders to capture the accumulated equity value. Any 
unsubscribed stock is offered to the public. Dunham (1985) finds that insiders purchase 20% of 
all conversion shares. Cox and Roden (1999) find that inside participation averaged 10% during 
the period 1988 – 1997. 
 
II. Model Development and Hypotheses 
A. Motivation  
In thrift demutualizations the new shareholders contribute proceeds from the offer in 
order to own all of the pre-existing value as well as the proceeds from the IPO. As a result, in a 
thrift demutualization, we expect some level of stock appreciation to occur at the time of the 
initial offer regardless of the level of proceeds. 1  Insiders are eligible to participate by buying 
shares at the offer price and they influence the terms of the conversion including the level of 
proceeds through the choice of offer price and number of shares. Because of these unique 
                                               
1 Assuming new capital is not invested in negative net present value (NPV) projects where the 
negative NPV more than offsets the value of the pre-existing capital. 
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characteristics, traditional IPO underpricing theories such as: asymmetric information [Rock 
(1986), Beatty and Ritter (1986), Benveniste and Spindt (1989), and Chemmanur (1993)], quality 
signals [Allen and Fualhaber (1989), Welch (1989), and Garfinkel (1993)], insurance from 
litigation [Drake and Vetsuypens (1993) and Lowry and Shu (2002)], and price support [Rudd 
(1993)] may only partially explain underpricing in demutualizing thrifts. 
Previous research poses that insiders may act opportunistically during stock offers. 
Giamarino, Heinkel, and Hollifield (1994) develop a model where insiders have motives to 
exploit private information in the secondary market while simultaneously issuing new shares in 
the primary market. Ang and Brau (2002) provide further evidence that insiders act 
opportunistically in traditional IPOs.   
To understand the parameters that affect the terms of a thrift demutualization, we rely on 
a model developed by Masulis (1987) and extended by Maksimovic and Unal (1993) and Unal 
(1997). Equation (1) shows that the value of the resulting stock firm (V1) is equal to the market 
value of the thrift prior to conversion (V0), plus the value of the proceeds (PROCEEDS) from the 
offer, plus the present value of new growth opportunities (PVGO) related to accessing the public 
capital markets. While investors in the IPO contribute the proceeds, they receive the rights to the 
total firm value (V1). 
 
V1 = V0 + PROCEEDS + PVGO       (1) 
 
The most commonly used valuation metric for depository firms is the price-to-book ratio 
[Rhoades (1987), Cheng, Gup, and Wall (1989), Rose (1991), and Brewer, Jackson, Jagtiani, and 
Nguyen (2000)]. At the time of the offer, the price-to-book ratio is equal to   
 




where EQUITY0 is the book value of equity prior to the offer and PROCEEDS is the offer price 
multiplied by the shares sold at the time of the offer. In the secondary market, the price-to-book 
ratio reflects the market value of the firm, incorporating the growth opportunities and the prior 
equity value. 
  
Price-to-book1 = (V0 + PROCEEDS + PVGO)/ (PROCEEDS + EQUITY0)   (3) 
 
The gain from underpricing can be observed through the change in the ratio of the price-to-book 
ratio in the secondary market (Price-to-book1) relative to the price-to-book ratio based on the 
offer price (Price-to-book0).  
Percent gain from the offer = (Price-to-book1 / Price-to-book0) – 1   (4) 
 
             = (V0 + PVGO) / (PROCEEDS)    (5) 
 
The initial shareholders invest the proceeds from the offer to receive the full value of the firm.  
The expected gain from this purchase is equal to the prior market value of the thrift plus the 
present value of the growth opportunities related to issuing public stock. 
Equations (1) through (5) demonstrate that the key determinant of underpricing and price 
ratios is the proceeds from the conversion. Rewriting equation (5) as V0/PROCEEDS + 
PVGO/PROCEEDS, highlights the potential tradeoff between the choice of offer size and the 
firm’s future performance. Minimizing the offer proceeds increases V0/PROCEEDS which 
reflects insiders and participating depositors capturing a greater proportion of the preexisting 
value of the mutual thrift. As stated in Maksimovic and Unal (1993, p 1664-1665), “If the mutual 
thrift has positive equity value but does not have positive NPV growth opportunities the 
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management can ensure that initial investors, including themselves, increase the return from 
investment ρ by minimizing the issue size.” 
The unique circumstances of mutual thrift IPOs create incentives for insiders to influence 
the offer parameters to permit greater inside ownership and allow purchase of the pre-existing 
thrift value at a low price. Depositors and insiders are given non-transferable rights to participate 
in the offer. Participating depositors’ incentives are aligned with the insiders in that each benefits 
from a low overall offer price represented by the level of proceeds. Using a simplified example, 
if the preexisting market value of the mutual thrift equals $50 million, then proceeds of $200 
million allow participants to buy a $250 million thrift for $200 million, resulting in an expected 
25% initial return. A lower amount of proceeds, such as $100 million, would result in a 50% 
initial return. Given wealth constraints of insiders and participating depositors, a lower level of 
proceeds allows investors to capture a higher percentage of the offer as well as a higher 
percentage of the preexisting value. 2 Non-participating depositors are not explicitly harmed by 
the offer, but instead suffer an opportunity loss by their choice not to participate.   
The second part of equation 5 incorporates the present value of growth opportunities 
PVGO.  If PVGO is a function of PROCEEDS (reflecting positive NPV investment 
opportunities); then greater PROCEEDS increase the long-run value of the firm and the wealth of 
participants. To avoid the transaction costs from a secondary offer, it may be “optimal for the 
thrift to increase the issue size and fully leverage up this additional equity” (Maksimovic and 
Unal p. 1665). Because thrift insiders have proprietary information regarding the value of PVGO, 
their decision relating to the level of proceeds is particularly interesting. Higher proceeds can 
                                               
2 The OTS prohibits insiders from borrowing from the thrift to purchase additional shares. 
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also provide unique benefits to insiders through greater leadership security and perquisite 
opportunities to manage more assets and personnel.  
Maksimovic and Unal (1993) find that higher inside participation in the offer is related to 
higher levels of issue size, where they define issue size as the offer price divided by the average 
of the minimum and maximum appraised value of the converting thrift.3 They also find that 
insider participation is positively related to initial IPO returns during the 1980 – 1985 period, but 
insignificant in the 1986 – 1988 period. They further report that insiders are not motivated by 
agency cost considerations. However, Maksimovic and Unal conduct their study during the 
1980s when the motivation for conversion was typically linked to regulatory concerns about 
capitalization and initial returns were relatively low (5%). In our more recent sample initial 
returns are more than four times as high. Thus, there may be changes in the role insiders play 
during mutual-to-stock conversions.  
It should not be surprising that insiders may favorably influence the terms of the offer.4 A 
thrift’s conversion offer price and proceeds are the result of a negotiated process between the 
thrift’s management, the underwriter, and the appraiser. Management also influences the choice 
of both underwriter and appraiser. Central to the appraisal process are a series of regulatory 
equations, which Unal (1997) shows to be flawed. Also as stated by Unal (1997) management 
                                               
3 We define issue size as the dollar proceeds raised in the offer.  Econometrically, we assume 
that our control variables (proxied by firm and industry characteristics) provide the best unbiased 
estimate of the anticipated level of proceeds.   
4 Many other studies already document that managers influence the parameters of their firm’s 
operating performance or reporting strategy to enhance their personal wealth through 
compensation agreements, dividend policy, stock repurchases, and insider trading [Yermack 
(1997), Aboody and Kasznik (2000), Karpoff and Lee (1991), Lee (1997), Kahle (2000), Clarke, 
Dunbar, and Kahle (2001), Lambert, Lanen, and Larcker (1989), and Fenn and Liang (2001)]. 
Previous studies also find evidence of self-interested managerial actions during changes in 
organizational structure such as IPOs [Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998), Field and Karpoff 
(2002), and Chalmers, Dann, and Harford (2002)].  
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chooses an offer price that is within 15 percent of this “appraised” value. Regulatory influence 
from the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS), personal wealth constraints, and tensions between 
short-term and long-term objectives, further complicate the process of setting the terms of the 
offer.   
 The degree to which management influences the offer size and price is constrained by 
regulators. Regulators realize that greater capital minimizes the cost of deposit insurance. Also as 
stated by Henry Gonzales, former House Banking Committee Chairman, regulators must ensure 
that “insiders and acquirers don’t benefit at the expense of the institution and its account holders” 
[Unal (1997)]. In fact, throughout the 1990s, with various degrees of intensity, the Office of 
Thrift Supervision (OTS) pressured appraisers and insiders of converting thrifts to increase price-
to-book ratios at the time of the offer [Smith and Underwood (1997)]. 
Ultimately, insiders face two decisions relating to the terms of the offer. Insiders must 
choose their personal level of financial participation as well as the overall level of proceeds. The 
level of proceeds results in a price-to-book ratio that cannot fall below the thrift regulators’ 
current acceptable threshold. Initial returns at the time of the offer are a reflection of this 
decision process.5   
Using data from 1980 to 1988, Maksimovic and Unal (1993) find average initial returns 
of 5%. In our sample of 347 conversions from 1991 to 2004, we find a 20.8% average initial 
return. The more recent time period includes the recapitalizations of well- capitalized thrifts with 
dramatically higher initial returns. The dramatic differences in initial returns, along with changes 
                                               
5 The level of proceeds reflects the overall price of the thrift. The price per share at the time of 
the offer is typically set at an arbitrary standard price (i.e. $8, $10, $12). The number of shares 
offered is determined by the proceeds divided by the offer price. Hence, insiders have only one 
degree of freedom in choosing the terms of the offer.   
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in the regulatory environment, provide motivation to investigate changes in the incentive for 
thrift insiders to influence the terms of the offer. 
B. Hypotheses 
Maksimovic and Unal (1993) use the percent of inside participation in the offer as a 
measure of asymmetric information. However, subsequent research by Boyle, Carter, and Stover 
(1998) demonstrates that a significant portion of inside participation is predictable based on 
publicly available information at the time of the thrift conversion. We use a process similar to 
Aggarwal, Prabhala, and Puri (2002) and Barro (1977) that differentiates between inside 
participation determined by public information (anticipated participation) and inside 
participation determined by asymmetric information (unanticipated participation).  
Based on these studies we develop three hypotheses. Our first hypothesis is that the level 
of unanticipated participation is positively correlated with the first-day IPO returns. A positive 
relationship between inside ownership and initial returns demonstrates that managerial 
participation can be viewed as a signal of first-day returns; however, it does not show whether 
the signal reflects future firm performance or managerial influence on the offer size. In our 
second and third hypotheses we test whether unanticipated inside ownership is statistically 
related to the offer size and future performance.   
If unanticipated managerial ownership is positively related to initial returns, offer size, 
and future performance, managerial participation provides a signal of the future performance of 
the firm. Consistent with traditional theory, managers purchase a larger share of the offer due to 
asymmetric information concerning future growth opportunities and offer proceeds are increased 
to take advantage of the positive net present value investments available to the thrift.  
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Alternatively, we may find that unanticipated managerial ownership is positively related 
to initial returns and negatively related to offer size, implying that management decreased the 
offer size to enhance IPO returns. If we also find a significant negative relationship between 
unanticipated managerial ownership and future operating performance, we can conclude that 
insiders reduced offer size at the expense of turning down positive NPV projects due to lack of 
capital. If there is a significant positive relationship between unanticipated managerial ownership 
and future performance, we can conclude that insiders reduced offer size to avoid potential over-
investment in negative net present value projects.6  
 
III.   Data 
 
Our sample includes conversions of mutual thrifts from 1991 to 2004. We chose this 
sample period for two reasons. First, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement 
Act (FDICIA) of 1991 created a new regulatory regime where unhealthy institutions were closed 
and healthier institutions began to prosper. Second, our primary data resource, SNL DataSource, 
only maintains balance sheet and income statement data on firms starting in 1991. We discard 
observations with missing variables and/or where data between SNL and CRSP had 
discrepancies that could not be rectified through a proxy statement. SNL DataSource provides 
details on offer proceeds, price, shares outstanding, price-to-book ratios, and inside participation 
at the time of the offer. SNL DataSource also provides information on the firm’s prior year ROA, 
                                               
6 Throughout our analysis, we assume that thrifts only issue and purchase new stock if positive 
NPV projects exist. Therefore, managers invest at least a portion of capital raised in positive 
NPV projects. We allow for the potential that managers may over-invest through an inverted U-
shape relationship between PVGO and the level of proceeds. 
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core capital ratio, and asset growth.7 We also use SNL DataSource to calculate the thrift industry 
average price-to-book ratio. The final sample consists of 347 thrifts. We winsorize variables at 
the 5th and the 95th percentile to insure the results are not driven by extreme values. 8 Table I 
shows the frequency of demutualizations by year. The numbers range from a low of 2 in 1991 to 
a high of 61 in 1995.9 
Table II provides a summary of mean values for selected variables. The average total 
assets of a demutualizing thrift in our sample is $285,980,270 with over three quarters of the 
converted thrifts trading on a major exchange. Average proceeds at the time of the offer equal 
$36,850,470.10 The average offer size is very similar to the offer size reported by Maksimovic 
and Unal (1993). The average one-day return at the time of the offer is 20.8%, compared to a 
one-day return of 5% in Maksimovic and Unal’s sample. Higher returns may be due to greater 
capitalization ratios (CORE), defined as core capital divided by risk-adjusted assets proxy for 
prior conversion value or a healthier industry climate as demonstrated by higher price-to-book 
                                               
7 Unlike SNL DataSource, SNL Securities Monthly Market Report does not always include 
measures of prior year ROA and capital ratios. For these observations we obtained ROA, capital 
ratios, and asset growth from the company’s SEC filings. 
8 Non-winsorized results provide similar conclusions. 
9 Beginning in 1992 some mutual thrifts elected to establish a mutual holding company (MHC) 
as an alternative means to convert to a stock company. In a MHC conversion, the maximum 
issue of publicly traded stock is 49.9%, while the majority shares are owned by a newly created 
holding company that is jointly owned by the thrift depositors. It is possible for a mutual thrift 
that converted to the MHC form to subsequently convert to a full stock company in a process 
termed a second-stage conversion. During a second-stage public offer, thrift depositors and 
insiders again receive non-transferable rights to purchase the company’s shares [Luse and 
Gorman (2005)]. Preliminary analysis shows no difference in insider influence on the offer based 
on the form of the demutualization. However, because the level of proceeds in a MHC is 
restricted to less than half of the total stock, we restrict our final analysis to full 
demutualizations. 
10 SNL includes both employee stock ownership plans (ESOP) and management recognition 
plans (MRP) in the gross proceeds. During our sample period, most conversions are fully 
subscribed and underwritten on a best-efforts basis. 
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ratios (IND_P/B) that proxy for industry growth opportunities. The offer price-to-book ratio 
averages 66.6% while the corresponding average industry price-to-book ratio is 97.7%.  
Table III shows correlations between the variables. The largest correlation, not 
surprisingly, is between assets and proceeds. None of the other correlations between variables 
appear to raise significant multicollinearity concerns. Actual inside participation is negatively 
correlated with the level of proceeds and the initial price-to-book ratio. Actual participation is 
not significantly correlated with initial returns.   
 
IV. Empirical Tests and Results 
Our empirical tests focus on the decisions of thrift insiders who must choose their 
personal level of financial participation in the offer as well as the overall level of proceeds. In 
subsections A and B below we develop measures of anticipated and unanticipated inside 
participation. In subsection C we relate these measures to the percentage price change at the time 
of the IPO. In subsection D we investigate the influence of insiders on measures of the offer size. 
Finally, in subsection E we test for a relationship between inside participation and long-term 
operating performance. 
A. Anticipated Inside Participation 
We use information publicly available at the time of the offer to estimate anticipated 
inside participation. We use an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression to predict inside 
participation (INSIDE), that we define as the percent of shares purchased by officers and 
directors. 11 Boyle, Carter, and Stover (1998) show inside participation in mutual conversions is 
inversely related to size. We define size (ASSETS) as the log of the firm’s total assets in 
                                               
11 We also use the log of inside participation and deviations from the maximum purchase. We 
find similar results with these alternative measures of inside participation.  
 14 
thousands from the year prior to the demutualization. Loderer and Martin (1997) and Demsetz 
and Villalonga (2001) show inside participation in traditional IPOs is a positive function of past 
performance. We measure growth (GROWTH) using the percent increase in assets from the year 
prior to recapitalization. We define performance (ROA) as the accounting percent return on 
assets in the year prior to the offer. To control for industry performance, we define IND_P/B as 
the industry average price-to-book ratio during the year of the offer. Without wealth constraints, 
we expect insiders to purchase larger portions of higher performing and faster growing firms. 
However, with wealth constraints, we do not expect insiders to purchase as large a portion of the 
firm when the offer size is larger due to firm size, greater growth opportunities, or stronger 
performance.  
Four additional variables control for firm specific and economic variation. To measure 
the level of current capital in the firm, we define CORE as the core capital ratio the year prior to 
the offer. EXCH is an indicator variable equal to one if the converted thrift trades on the NYSE, 
AMEX, or NASDAQ and zero otherwise. INDEX measures the returns on the thrift index in the 
six weeks prior to the offer and CMT measures the six-week change in interest rates. As 
economic activity improves we anticipate greater levels of inside participation. 
Stock options, stock ownership plans, and management recognition plans may also 
influence an insider’s decision to participate in the offer. The prospectus of a converting thrift 
typically provides information relating to management’s anticipated levels of participation in 
these plans. We find the mean level of stock options granted to insiders is 9.68% of total shares. 
The OTS limits option participation to a maximum of 10%. In fact, 241 of 261 thrifts (91%) 
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report 10% anticipated participation. 12 The mean level of reported employee stock ownership 
plans (ESOP) and management recognition plans (MRP) is 7.62% and 3.81% respectively. The 
data demonstrate a lack of variability similar to options. The inclusion of this data in our 
regressions does not affect any of our conclusions, but does reduce the sample size. Therefore, 
we choose to omit options from the reported tables.   
In Table IV, we illustrate that inside participation has a negative relationship with the size 
of the firm (ASSETS), whether the firm is listed on an exchange (EXCH), the core capital ratio 
(CORE), and the industry price-to-book ratio (IND_P/B). Wealth constraints limit the proportion 
of larger firms that insiders can purchase. As shown in equation 5, offers with larger prior 
conversion value and firms with greater growth opportunities are expected to have larger offer 
sizes (confirmed later in Table V). The increase in the size of the offer, combined with the 
wealth constraints of managers, result in lower levels of managerial participation when the 
industry price-to-book ratio (IND_P/B) and firm capitalization (CORE) are high. An alternate 
explanation for the negative coefficient on CORE is that conservative thrift managers who are 
more likely to oversee higher levels of core capital are less likely to participate in potentially 
controversial conversions. Finally, firms trading on national exchanges are larger, limiting the 
ability of managers to purchase as large of a fraction of the firm. Performance measures such as 
GROWTH and ROA, that were previously found to be positively related to inside participation in 
IPOs, are not significant in this sample of thrift demutualizations. 
                                               
12 Our sample size relating to stock options, employee stock ownership plans and management 
recognition plans is reduced to 261 based on data availability. Option plans are not voted on until 
at least six-months following the IPO.   
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B. Measuring Asymmetric Information with Unanticipated Inside Purchases 
The results displayed in model 1 of Table IV use information available at the time of the 
offer to determine the predicted level of inside participation. However, on the day of the offer, 
investors can use information in the proxy statement to observe the actual number of shares that 
management purchases. We define unanticipated participation (U_INSIDE) as the difference 
between the actual participation in the offer and the predicted participation as shown in model 1 
of Table IV. This is consistent with the methodology suggested by Aggarwal, Prabhala, and Puri 
(2002). We posit that unanticipated inside participation signals asymmetric information 
concerning the future performance of the firm and/or the extent to which insiders manipulated 
IPO returns through their influence on offer size.  
C. Percentage Price Change at the Time of the IPO 
In model 2 of Table IV, we regress the percentage one-day price change (∆PRICE) at the 
time of the IPO on the actual level of inside participation (INSIDE). The INSIDE coefficient is 
insignificant, indicating that actual participation does not explain initial returns. While 
Maksimovic and Unal (1993) find inside participation positively related to initial returns, the 
relationship did not hold in the last three years of their sample (1986 – 1988). Colanuoni (1998) 
goes further to show the changing character of demutulizations from the 1980’s to the 1990’s.  
Both equity capitalization and initial returns increase significantly in the 1990’s. Holding 
proceeds constant, greater pre-conversion equity is expected to increase offer day returns 
(equation 5). 
In model 3, when inside participation is split into anticipated (A_INSIDE) and 
unanticipated levels (U_INSIDE), both variables are significant but with opposite signs. 
Anticipated participation is negatively related to the initial return while unanticipated 
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participation is positively related. As shown in model 1, unanticipated inside participation has a 
strong negative correlation with asset size. Due to the omission of assets in model 2, 
unanticipated inside participation proxies for size; resulting in an inverse relationship with initial 
returns.  
In model 4 of Table IV, we include all of the explanatory variables used to predict inside 
participation in model 1. SIZE and exchange (EXCH) proxy for issue firm size. Pre-conversion 
capital (CORE) proxies for the value of the thrift prior to conversion. GROWTH, ROA, and 
industry price-to-book (IND_P/B) proxy for the individual firm and industry growth 
opportunities. Consistent with Maksimovic and Unal (1993), we control for current market 
conditions using the percent change in the equal-weighted thrift index over the previous thirty 
trading days (INDEX), and the percent change in the ten-year constant maturity Treasury rate 
over the previous thirty trading days (CMT). The increase in the adjusted R2 indicates that these 
variables provide information beyond that used to predict inside participation. Greater initial 
returns are experienced by larger, more profitable firms that demutualize during periods of strong 
industry performance. INDEX, which reflects changes in current industry conditions, is also 
positive and highly significant. As hypothesized, higher levels of unanticipated insider purchases 
are related to significantly higher returns to initial investors. 13 For every 1% increase in the 
unanticipated level of insider purchases the return increases by approximately 0.5%. For the 
average offer, a $368,505 increase in inside participation increases IPO investor first-day returns 
by $184,252.  
                                               
13 We report the results based on ordinary least squares. As stated in Aggarwal, Prabhala, and 
Puri (2002, p.1438) “non-OLS structural estimates …are only needed when there is at least one 
variable in the allocation equation that does not enter into the returns equation.” In our analysis 
all variables from the estimation of inside ownership are also included in the IPO returns 
equation.  
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As a whole, models 3 and 4 show that unanticipated participation by insiders is related to 
higher initial returns at the time of the offer. If anything, anticipated participation is related to 
lower returns. Thus, the two components clearly provide different information about the thrift 
and the terms of the offer. Next, we test whether inside participation in a demutualizing firm is 
more than the traditional signal of management’s expectations about the quality of the firm.   
D. Insider Influence on the Offer Size 
As we show in equation 5, a lower offer size increases returns at the time of the offer. 
Insiders that purchase a larger portion of the offer may enhance initial returns by reducing the 
offer size. To test our second hypothesis, we use three measures of offer size as dependent 
variables in our regression analysis. First, we use PROC, defined as the log of proceeds from the 
offer in thousands. In model 2, offer size is measured using proceeds divided by the book value 
of equity following the offer; resulting in the offer price-to-book ratio (P/B). 14 To further ensure 
the robustness of our results, we also measure offer size as proceeds scaled by the book value of 
assets prior to the offer (PROC/ASSETS). This measure controls for the high level of correlation 
between proceeds and assets, as demonstrated in Table III.  
For each model in Table V, we use the independent variables from the estimate of inside 
participation (model 1 Table IV). As posited in our second hypothesis, we also include 
U_INSIDE to represent the level of unanticipated inside participation.  
All variables except for U_INSIDE are positive, indicating that larger thrifts with stronger 
firm and industry performance generate higher levels of proceeds. U_INSIDE is significant and 
                                               
14 Prior literature shows that price-to-book ratios are both an important valuation metric and a 
measure of growth opportunities in the firm. Consistent with Cheng et al. (1989), Rogawski and 
Simonson (1989), Frieder and Petty (1991), Rose (1991), Palia (1993), Fraser and Kolari (1988), 
Shawky et al. (1996) and Brewer et al. (2000), price-to-book ratios are expected to be positively 
related to return-on-assets (ROA), equity-to-assets (CORE), and size (ASSETS). 
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negative, confirming that when management purchases a larger than anticipated share of the 
offer, the offer size is lower. Thrift managers use their influence to reduce the level of proceeds 
in order to obtain higher initial returns on the offer date. Based on the average level of proceeds, 
for each one percent increase in unanticipated inside participation, there is a 0.016 decrease in 
the log of expected proceeds (a reduction of 0.87% in average proceeds, (e9.91–
e9.894)*1000/36,850,470). For the average offer, a $368,505 reduction in inside participation 
results in a $324,680  reduction in proceeds. 
E. Tests of Long-Term Performance 
Our results lead us to suspect that insiders who purchase a larger than anticipated portion 
of the offer reduce the size of the offer to enhance first-day returns; however, we have not ruled 
out the hypothesis that inside participation in an equity offer is a positive signal of long-term 
performance. Managers could purchase a larger portion of the offer in anticipation of greater 
future performance and/or growth opportunities. Under this scenario, higher first-day returns are 
a result of outside investors interpreting inside participation as a signal of future performance.  
We use several measures of long-term performance. Specifically, ROA3 is the return-on-
assets at the end of the third year after the conversion. CHANGE_ROA is the change in the 
return-on-assets from the year prior to the conversion to three years after the conversion, minus 
the equivalent change from the thrift industry. As highlighted in Table VI, unanticipated inside 
participation is not related to future performance as measured by ROA3 and CHANGE_ROA.  
We use subsequent stock returns as an additional measure of future performance. We 
define ADJ_STOCK as the industry adjusted cumulative three-year return for the stock after the 
IPO, excluding the initial one-day return. Once again, there is no evidence that unanticipated 
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participation is linked to greater long-term performance. 15 Based on these findings, we reject the 
alternative hypothesis that greater than anticipated inside participation signals expectation about 
the future performance of the thrift. We conclude that greater than anticipated inside 
participation instead signals insiders have incentives to reduce the size of the offer to influence 





Using a sample of 347 conversions of mutual thrifts from 1991 to 2004, we find a 20.8% 
average initial return, which is dramatically higher than returns reported by Maksimovic and 
Unal (1993) for the 1980s. In contrast to the capital impaired thrifts of the 1980’s, recent 
demutulizations of well-capitalized thrifts have dramatically higher initial returns. 
We use demutualizations in the thrift industry to investigate the role that company 
insiders play in the initial public offer process. Previous studies propose that inside participation 
in a demutualizing thrift is a signal of firm value. We test whether inside participation in the 
offer is positively related to returns on the first day of the IPO. We demonstrate that it is the 
unanticipated portion of inside purchases that signals greater first-day return performance.  
Returns are higher when insiders purchase a larger than anticipated portion of the offer.  
                                               
15 In addition to the subsequent performance measures discussed above, we use net interest 
margin and growth in assets. First, we use the net interest margin defined both as the net interest 
margin at the end of the third year after the conversion and as the industry adjusted change in net 
interest margin after three years. Maksimovic and Unal (1993) evaluate the impact of 
demutualization on the subsequent growth of the firm. We use the growth in assets in the three 
years subsequent to the offer. In results not shown, we do not find a statistically significant 
relationship between the level of unanticipated inside participation in the offer and future net 
interest margin or firm growth.  
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Unanticipated levels of managerial participation are negatively related to the size of the 
offer. In a thrift demutualization, the lower the offer size, the greater the expected return. Initial 
shareholders invest the proceeds to receive the full value of the firm, including the pre-IPO 
market value of the thrift and the present value of growth opportunities related to the new capital. 
We find no evidence that inside participation is related to the future performance of the firm. Our 
study demonstrates that thrift managers are not signaling future performance, but rather the 
extent that the offer size has been reduced to enhance first-day IPO returns. It should be noted 
that greater inside participation and its influence on proceeds are not at odds with the interests of 
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Summary Statistics of Selected Variables 
 
ASSETS is calculated as the log of the firm’s total assets in thousands from the year prior to the demutualization. 
EXCH is equal to one if traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ – zero otherwise. CORE is the core capital ratio 
as a percentage equal to core capital divided by risk-adjusted assets from the year prior to the offer. GROWTH is the 
percent increase in assets from the year prior to the conversion. ROA is the percent return-on-assets in the year prior 
to the offer. IND_P/B is the industry average price to book ratio at the year of the demutualization. INSIDE is the 
percent of the shares purchased by officers and directors. ∆PRICE is the percent price change at the IPO. PROC is 
defined as the log of proceeds from the offer in thousands. P/B is the ratio of the offer price-to-book value at the 
time of the offer. PROC/ASSETS is the ratio proceeds to the assets in the year prior to demutualization.  
 




     











































20.78% 15.69% -2.50% 55.00% 
 
































14.12% 6.29% 2.88% 26.83% 
* After Winsorizing 
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Table III   
Correlation Matrix of Regression Variables 
 
ASSETS is calculated as the log of the firm’s total assets in thousands from the year prior to the demutualization. 
EXCH is equal to one if traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ – zero otherwise. CORE is the core capital ratio 
as a percentage equal to core capital divided by risk-adjusted assets from the year prior to the offer. GROWTH is the 
percent increase in assets from the year prior to the conversion. ROA is the percent return-on-assets in the year prior 
to the offer. IND_P/B is the industry average price to book ratio at the year of the demutualization. INSIDE is the 
percent of the shares purchased by officers and directors. ∆PRICE is the percent price change at the IPO. PROC is 
defined as the log of proceeds in thousands from the offer. P/B is the ratio of the offer price-to-book value at the 
time of the offer. PROC/ASSETS is the ratio proceeds to the assets in the year prior to demutualization.  P-values are 
given in parentheses. 
      
 ASSETS EXCH CORE GROWTH ROA IND_P/B INSIDE ∆PRICE PROC P/B 
ASSETS 1 
 
        
 
EXCH 0.566 (0.000) 1        
 
CORE -0.310 (0.000) 
-0.038 
(0.483) 1       
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Ordinary Least Squares Regression of  
Inside Participation and Percentage Price Change at the Time of the IPO 
 
The dependent variable, INSIDE, in model 1 is the percent of the shares purchased by officers and directors. In 
models 2, 3, and 4, the dependent variable, ∆PRICE, is the percentage price change at the IPO. ASSETS is calculated 
as the log of the firm’s total assets in thousands from the year prior to the demutualization. EXCH is equal to one if 
traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ – zero otherwise. CORE is the core capital ratio as a percentage equal to 
core capital divided by risk-adjusted assets from the year prior to the offer. GROWTH is the percent increase in 
assets from the year prior to the conversion. ROA is the percent return-on-assets in the year prior to the offer. 
IND_P/B is the industry average price to book ratio at the year of the demutualization. INDEX is the return on the 
thrift index in the six week period preceding the offer. CMT is the six week change in the ten-year Constant Maturity 
Treasury yield. INSIDE is the percent of the shares purchased by officers and directors. A_INSIDE is the predicted 
value of inside participation using the model shown in model 1. U_INSIDE is the error term from model 1. t-values 
appear in parentheses below coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** denote significance at the .1, .05, and .01 levels 
respectively for two-tailed tests. 
 
 Dependent Variables 
Independent  
Variables 
INSIDE  ∆PRICE 
Model 1  Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 







































   -1.833 
(-0.82) 
INSIDE   -0.080 
(-0.57) 
  
A_INSIDE    -1.043 
(-4.70)*** 
 




      
Observations 347  347 347 347 
Adjusted R2 .360  -0.002 0.076 .345 
p-value of F-test <.0001  0.569 <.0001 <.0001 
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Table V 
Ordinary Least Square Regression of Measures of the Level of Proceeds 
 
PROC is defined as the log of proceeds from the offer in thousands. P/B is the offer price to book value at the time 
of the offer. PROC/ASSETS is defined as the proceeds of the offer divided by the assets in the year prior to 
demutualization. ASSETS is calculated as the log of the firm’s total assets in thousands from the year prior to the 
demutualization. EXCH is equal to one if traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ – zero otherwise. CORE is the 
core capital ratio as a percentage equal to core capital divided by risk-adjusted assets from the year prior to the offer. 
GROWTH is the percent increase in assets from the year prior to the conversion. ROA is the percent return-on-assets 
in the year prior to the offer. IND_P/B is the industry average price to book ratio at the year of the demutualization. 
U_INSIDE is the error term using the model shown in Table IV. t-values appear in parentheses below coefficient 
estimates. *, **, and *** denote significance at the .1, .05, and .01 levels respectively for two-tailed tests. 
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Observations 347 347 347 
Adjusted R2 .908 .426 .637 







Ordinary Least Square Regression of Subsequent ROA and Stock Performance  
 
ROA3 is the return-on-assets at the end of the third year after the conversion. CHANGE_ROA is the ratio of the 
return-on-assets three years after the conversion divided by the return-on-assets from the year before the conversion, 
minus the equivalent ratio from the thrift industry. ADJ_STOCK is the industry adjusted cumulative three-year 
return for the stock after the IPO. ASSETS is calculated as the log of the firm’s total assets in thousands from the 
year prior to the demutualization. EXCH is equal to one if traded on the NYSE, AMEX, or NASDAQ – zero 
otherwise. CORE is the core capital ratio as a percentage equal to core capital divided by risk-adjusted assets from 
the year prior to the offer. GROWTH is the percent increase in assets from the year prior to the conversion. ROA is 
the percent return-on-assets in the year prior to the offer. IND_P/B is the industry average price to book ratio at the 
year of the demutualization. INDEX is the return on the thrift index in the six week period preceding the offer. CMT 
is the six week change in the ten-year Constant Maturity Treasury yield. U_INSIDE is the error term using the 
model shown in Table IV. t-values appear in parentheses below coefficient estimates. *, **, and *** denote 
significance at the .1, .05, and .01 levels respectively for two-tailed tests. 
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Observations 247 247 219 
Adjusted R2 0.103 0.337 0.144 
p-value of F-test <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
 
